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Abstract
We develop a denition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings.
The denition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium
outcomes for any Pareto eÆcient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides
with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by
successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with
the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specic settings and show that
studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known
\chaos" theorems.
JEL classication numbers: D71, D72
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Equilibrium Agenda Formation

Bhaskar Dutta Matthew O. Jackson Michele Le Breton
1 Introduction
The importance of agenda formation in a wide variety of settings, ranging from commit-
tees to popular elections, is self-evident. In fact, in some legislative settings where the
voting on specic bills is highly predictable, one might argue that the most interesting
strategic interaction takes place in the formation of the agenda.
Indeed, the wide literature that analyzes various aspects of voting recognizes the
importance of the agenda, and has shown how important it can be (e.g., McKelvey
(1976, 1979)). Nevertheless, we still lack tractable models of agenda formation, and a
detailed understanding of how the formation of the agenda ultimately aects the outcome
of voting. To quote Ordeshook (1993):
More problematic is the issue of endogenous agendas, the process whereby
agendas are formed via the sequential introduction and labeling of alternatives
to be voted on. ... The particular problem is that to apply game theory we
must provide a game form that species precisely the identity of decision
makers, the sequence with which they make decisions, and the information
at their disposal when they act. And although agenda voting, like simple
descriptions of elections, lends itself readily to the construction of such form,
the processes whereby agendas are formed is far less structured and, thereby,
less amenable to unambiguous game-theoretical analysis.
Ordeshook's statement points out the diÆculty of modeling agenda formation stemming
from the lack of a clearly dened game form.
In this paper we provide a model of agenda formation, and in particular one that does
not rest on a specic game form or protocol. Nevertheless, we still wish to capture strate-
gic reasoning. The way in which we do this is to use a backwards induction approach.
We examine the continuation equilibria that might extend from any given agenda, based

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on previous inductions where equilibrium continuations have been dened starting from
longer agendas.
The key to how we are able to make progress in dening equilibrium agenda formation
without reference to a specic protocol is through a simple observation that ends up
having powerful implications. That observation concerns when it is possible to stop at
some agenda under an equilibrium: It is an equilibrium to stop at some agenda only if
no agent prefers any continuation equilibrium. We show that the sequential rationality
and stopping conditions alone provide strong conclusions for what the set of equilibrium
agendas can include.
In particular, we show that if a voting rule always selects an outcome that is Pareto
eÆcient relative to the agenda that has been proposed, then sequential rationality and
stopping conditions imply that equilibrium agendas will result in voting outcomes that
are Pareto eÆcient overall. Moreover, one of our main results states that for Pareto
eÆcient voting rules the equilibrium outcomes will always be a subset of what might
arise from considering the set of complete agendas (including all outcomes). This result
turns out to allow us to make fairly sharp predictions concerning equilibrium agendas
in many settings. For example, if the voting rule does not depend on the specic order
of the agenda, then equilibrium agendas result in a unique outcome which is that when
all alternatives are included in the voting. This also has important implications for
voting rules where the order of the agenda does matter, such as the well-studied example
of voting by successive elimination. There we show that equilibrium agendas always
result in outcomes that lie in the Banks' set. Similarly, for voting rules that always pick
outcomes that lie in the top cycle of the alternatives on the agenda, we show that the
equilibrium agendas must result in outcomes that lie in the top-cycle of all alternatives.
So, if for instance, a Condorcet winner exists and the voting rule is Condorcet consistent,
then all equilibrium agendas include (and thus result in) the Condorcet winner.
While sequential rationality and stopping conditions already have a substantial im-
pact on identifying agendas, we can impose further conditions to produce more specic
equilibrium sets and predictions. We also examine a consistency condition which requires
that if one continuation is an equilibrium, and some agent prefers another continuation
(which would be an equilibrium if the agenda is extended by the addition of one alter-
native), then this second continuation must also be an equilibrium. The converse is also
imposed: unless there is a unique equilibrium agenda, all equilibrium agendas must be
rationalizable in that at least some agent must weakly prefer them to some other equi-
librium continuation. In the context of Pareto eÆcient voting rules, we show that the
consistency condition ties down the set of equilibrium agendas uniquely and provides a
simple algorithm for identifying them.
Some Related Literature
Part of the motivation behind our analysis comes from the literature on \chaos" the-
orems. For instance, McKelvey (1976, 1979) has shown that in the context of majority
2
rule and Euclidean settings, the top cycle of alternatives is either a singleton (a Con-
dorcet winner) or the whole space. And, as Plott (1973) has shown, the second case is
the generic one.
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This implies that in most cases, starting from one alternative one can
nd a sequence of alternatives leading to any other, where each one in the sequence beats
the previous one under a (myopic) majority vote. While the conclusion that one should
draw from such a result and whether or not \chaos" is an appropriate nickname has been
debated, it is clear that such a result makes it critical to have an understanding of equi-
librium agendas - otherwise one can be left without any prediction. This is essentially the
primary motivation for our analysis. As such, we come back below to examine the pre-
dictions our equilibrium notion makes in the context of voting by successive elimination,
and discuss the relation to chaos theorems.
An alternative approach to modeling agenda formation is to assume a specic pro-
tocol, for instance a completely specied extensive form game where each possible move
of every player is explicit, and analyze its implications. For instance random recognition
rules were studied in the context of multilateral bargaining (divide-the- dollar games)
by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and a literature that followed. That approach provides
for strong analytical conclusions. However, that approach is not so tractable outside of
the distributive setting as the games become quite diÆcult to analyze. Moreover, there
are many applications where the protocol is not clear, as the above quote of Ordeshook
points out. The advantages to the approach taken in this paper are that it can be applied
to a general class of voting problems, where for instance, Euclidean preferences may not
be appropriate; and it makes protocol-free predictions.
With regard to making protocol-free predictions, we remark that the sets of equilibria
uncovered here should be viewed as a set of potential equilibria. Adding more knowledge
of the specic protocol may induce selections from the set we identify, and result in
more specic predictions. Nevertheless, as we shall show, fairly minimal requirements on
the equilibrium set already allow for some tight predictions in the context of a variety
of voting rules. Thus there are important aspects of equilibrium agendas that can be
characterized without detailed knowledge of the protocol.
Work on equilibrium agenda formation has also been done in other contexts. For ex-
ample, Banks and Gasmi (1987) examined equilibrium agenda formation in three person
committees. Their analysis is of a Euclidean setting and one where the three committee
members can make only one proposal each, and so agendas are truncated. Specifying
the problem to this level leads to sharp predictions. More recently, Penn (2001), in the
context of three person divide-the-dollar games has extended the analysis to allow for
arbitrary agenda lengths by a clever adaptation to innite agendas, and shows that sharp
predictions again result (but dier from those of Banks and Gasmi). The above results
are very encouraging in the face of \chaos" theorems, and may be thought of as answer-
ing those theorems by saying that if we do model agenda formation, then we can make
specic predictions. Nevertheless, the above analyses come in very specic settings and
1
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elvey's theorem.
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are dependent upon the geometry of Euclidean preferences, and in some cases having
three proposers and having a strong symmetry among them. Our analysis attempts to
provide an equilibrium denition that can be applied to a more general set of problems.
Our main motivation is to develop a concept that does not require such specic geometry,
and at the same time does not demand detailed specication of the proposal protocol.
2
As such, the predictions our analysis makes are not always as crisp; but nevertheless are
fairly specic in many settings.
Equilibrium agenda formation has also been analyzed in the setting of strategic-
candidacy. For instance, in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate's (1997)
models of citizen- candidates the decision to enter an election and take a position is
studied under equilibrium. In other work (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001, 2002))
we have examined the properties of equilibrium sets of candidates for a variety of voting
rules and for voting by successive elimination. Part of our motivation in studying agenda
formation more broadly comes from noting the impact of strategic candidacy. As shown
in Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001), all non-dictatorial voting rules result in some
situations where some non-winning candidates have an incentive to exit the election to
manipulate the outcome.
3
This implies that strategic agenda formation is critical to all
voting rules, at least when the agenda consists of candidates. Moreover, Dutta, Jackson,
and Le Breton (2001, 2002) provide examples where the equilibrium candidate entry de-
cisions result in Pareto ineÆcient outcomes even though the voting procedure is Pareto
eÆcient. While the issue of strategic candidacy is an important example of endogenous
agenda formation, modeling agenda formation more generally requires a dierent ap-
proach. Most importantly, the candidacy decision ultimately rests with the candidate.
4
This means that the proposal abilities of agents are limited. This provides for dierent
strategic considerations than, for instance, in a legislative setting where proposers are
not restricted in the alternatives that they may propose. One important question (that
we answer here in the aÆrmative) is whether or not such problems of ineÆcient outcomes
would be overcome in settings in which any voter can propose any alternative. When we
compare the outcomes of strategic agenda formation in the context of strategic candidacy
and in the more general setting where proposers are not limited; we see that there are
important distinctions.
Another branch of the literature that has touched on equilibrium agenda formation is
that which has looked at sophisticated voting by successive elimination. In particular, a
denition of equilibrium agendas appears in work by Miller, Grofman, and Feld (1990).
In their analysis an agenda is an equilibrium if nobody would gain by adding some
alternative to the current agenda. The important dierences between such a denition
and the ones presented here are in the beliefs of the proposers. The denition of Miller,
2
Another distinction is that our approach is based on one of inductively dening equilibrium con-
tinuations, and so equilibria are dened in a manner that can be thought of as analogous to subgame
perfect equilibrium (but without a game form). Instead the Banks and Gasmi (1987) and Penn (2001)
formulations use a \maximin-Stackelberg" based equilibrium notion.
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results and consideration of multi-valued voting rules.
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Even if one allows candidates to be nominated, they usually have the option to decline to run.
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Grofman, and Feld does not account for the fact that in many cases the agenda will not
end, but instead will be subject to further modications. Thus, proposers are acting
myopically.
5
If proposers can make any predictions about continuations, rather than
myopically assuming the agenda will end, then the outcome in general will be quite
dierent. This emphasizes an important aspect of our denitions. Incorporating such
sequential rationality and anticipating equilibrium continuations is the foundation on
which we build our denitions. We come back to examine the impact of this feature
below, when we apply our denitions to voting by successive elimination.
Finally, we mention a distantly related literature in terms of applications and specics;
but more closely related in terms of nding equilibrium denitions that are not tied down
to protocol specication. In particular, the literature on coalition formation (and on coali-
tional bargaining) faces a similar diÆculty to that expressed in the quote of Ordeshook
above. Writing down specic bargaining protocols allows for sharp predictions, but ones
that may not be robust and are not so easily adapted to settings where the protocol
is not obvious. Chwe (1994) provides a denition of consistent sets of alternatives that
might come out of coalitional bargaining settings, that is not dependent on any specic
protocol and yet still makes intuitively appealing predictions in many applications (see
also Greenberg (1990) for such an analysis of general social situations). Our approach
here is intended to do the same thing for agenda formation problems. While there is a
parallel in spirit, the actual equilibrium denition that we provide and the issues we face
are more specic to agenda formation and bear little resemblance to that in Chwe's (or
Greenberg's) work.
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2 Denitions
Alternatives
There is a set of alternatives X. Generic elements are denoted x, y, and z.
We begin the analysis with the case where X is nite and with #X = m, as this
brings out the intuitions most clearly. We then return to show how our analysis extends
to the innite case in Section 5.7.
Society will select one of these alternatives. These may be potential bills that a
legislature might enact, a set of candidates that a society might elect, or a list of potential
decisions that a committee might reach.
5
Austen-Smith (1987), Duggan (2002) and Groseclose and Krehbiel (1993) also examine equilibrium
agenda formation under voting by successive elimination. Their approach does not have the myopic
problem of Miller, Grofman, and Feld; which they avoid by assuming a xed ordering (or lottery) over
individuals who can each make a single proposal. However, their focus is on analyzing (sophisticated
sincerity) under the amendment procedure, and not on characterizing equilibrium agendas more broadly.
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Let us also point out that our use of the word consistency has no relationship to that of Chwe's
consistent sets.
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Voters or Decision Makers
The set N = f1; : : : ; ng is a nite set of voters.
These are the individuals who are involved in determining the agenda and the outcome
from that agenda. In Section 6 we discuss the possibility of having special roles for some
individuals.
Preferences
Individuals have preferences over the set of alternatives represented by a complete and
transitive binary relation, R
i
. The strict preference relation associated with R
i
is denoted
P
i
, and is dened by xP
i
y if and only if not yR
i
x. As usual, knowing P
i
similarly denes
R
i
, and so we keep track of the strict relationship with the weak one being inferred.
Let P denote the set of admissible proles of preference relations. The notation P 2 P
denotes a generic prole P = (P
1
; : : : ; P
n
).
In some applications P will be a restricted domain. A number of dierent examples
appear in what follows.
Agendas
An agenda of length k 2 f1; : : : ; mg is a nite vector of alternatives (x
1
; : : : ; x
k
) 2 X
k
,
with the restriction that x
i
6= x
j
for each i 6= j.
Let A
k
denote the set of agendas of length k, and let A = [
m
k=1
A
k
be the set of all
agendas.
The restriction that the same alternative not appear more than once in an agenda is
common to many legislative and committee settings. Given that the set of alternatives
X could be quite large and dense, this does not prevent an alternative and a close
approximation of it from appearing in an agenda.
Let us emphasize that depending on how the voting procedure works, the sequence
of the agenda may or may not matter. For instance if the agenda is simply a list of nom-
inated candidates and some neutral voting procedure is used, then the agendas (x; y; z)
and (z; y; x) would be equivalent. However, if the voting procedure is non-neutral, then
the sequence can be important. For instance, under voting by successive elimination
where proposed alternatives are voted upon in reverse order of their proposal the agen-
das (x; y; z) and (z; y; x) are not equivalent and could lead to dierent outcomes.
Extensions of an Agenda
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In many situations of interest, some part of an agenda will already be on the table.
For example, if there is a status quo, then it may take the rst place in any agenda that
follows. More generally, in building a denition of equilibrium we need to be able to
make predictions starting from various existing agendas and so it is useful to consider
the concept of the extensions of a given agenda.
With this in mind, for any k and a 2 A
k
let A(a) to be the set of all agendas that
agree with a in the rst k spots. That is,
A(a) = fa
0
2 A j a
0
h
= a
h
8h 2 f1; : : : ; kgg:
We let A
Full
(a) = A(a) \ A
m
denote the agendas of full length that are extensions of
a.
Voting Procedures
A voting procedure is a function V : A  P ! X such that V (a) 2 a for all a 2 A
and P 2 P.
A voting procedure thus summarizes the choice the society would make from a given
agenda at a given preference prole.
Let us emphasize that this formulation is very exible and allows for many applica-
tions. For instance, it could be that V is determined by strategic voting or instead by
sincere voting. Also, V might depend on the ordering of the agenda or it might not; and
V might be anonymous, or it might treat some voters specially.
The details of how V is determined will not be important in developing our denition
of equilibrium agenda formation. Later, in providing some results about the properties of
equilibria, we will specify some properties of potential voting rules V and examine some
specic voting rules.
The one restrictive assumption that is implicit in our specication of a voting rule is
that it is single-valued. This may involve some deterministic tie-breaking rule in the event
that some alternatives are tied. It may also be that under a given voting procedure there
are multiple voting equilibria (taking the agenda as given), and hence multiple possible
outcomes. In order to adapt our approach to situations where there may be several voting
outcomes for a given agenda, one can apply our denitions to each possible equilibrium
selection of the voting procedure. Although we do not do this explicitly here, it is an
easy extension of our results.
In much of what follows, the set of alternatives X, the voting rule V , and the pref-
erence prole P will be given, and so we omit their notation as arguments in various
functions.
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3 Equilibrium Agendas
Before presenting the formal denitions of equilibrium, we begin with a simple example
to motivate and illustrate the denitions.
Example 1
X = fx; y; zg and x is the status quo.
The voters' preferences form a classic cycle:
 xP
1
yP
1
z
 yP
2
zP
2
x
 zP
3
xP
3
y
Here x beats y, y beats z, and z beats x under majority rule.
The voting rule is sincere voting by successive elimination. For instance, if the agenda
is (x; z; y), then rst a vote is held between y and z, and then the winner is matched
against x. Under sincere voting, the outcome of this agenda would be x, as y would
defeat z and then x would beat y.
7
Here, the only possible outcomes are x from agendas
(x; y; z), (x; z; y), (x; y) and x; and z from agenda (x; z).
Let us discuss equilibrium conditions based on this example. Once an agenda of
three alternatives has been reached, there are no alternatives left to propose, and so
an equilibrium continuation is simply the agenda in question. Next let us step back and
consider an agenda of length 2 that starts with the status quo x. There are only two such
agendas to consider. One is the agenda (x; z). If this agenda is reached, then agent 1 by
adding the alternative y would change the outcome from z to x. This would make agent
1 better o, and so the agenda (x; z) would not be stable to amendment.
8
This suggests
7
A situation which approximately ts this one is that of the Powell amendment discussed by Denzau,
Riker, and Shepsle (1985) and others. The alternative x would be the status quo of no U.S. federal
funding of local public schools. The bill z under consideration in the House of Representatives was
one that would introduce some federal funding of local public schools. The amendment to the bill y
introduced by Powell was to deny federal funding to public schools that practiced segregation (this was
in the 1950's). As Denzau, Riker and Shepsle argue, sincere voting could be explained by the diÆculty
in explaining voting against the Powell amendment to one's constituency. In fact, the situation had
some mixture of sincere and sophisticated voting, as some representatives who opposed funding (and
supported segregation) may have voted for the Powell amendment in the rst round and then against it
in the second round. So there may have been some conservative representatives who had the preferences
of voter 1 except with z and y reversed, but who when voting strategically would vote the same as
voter 1 would vote when voting sincerely. The motivations behind the voting are not so critical to the
example. All that matters to the analysis is that from a full agenda the outcome would be x, while from
an agenda of only x and z the outcome would be z.
8
Interestingly, in this example if we require a second agent to support a proposal in order for it to
become part of the agenda, neither of the remaining agents would second the proposal. This turns out
to be an artifact of the sincere voting and also the fact that there is only one agent with any given
preference prole. We discuss how this is not a problem for sophisticated voting below.
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one of the conditions in our equilibrium denition: that stopping at a given agenda is an
equilibrium if and only if there is no agent who can benet from advancing the agenda to
some further continuation equilibrium. So, the only continuation equilibrium following
(x; z) is the agenda (x; z; y). Next, let us back things up. Given the agenda x in place,
if some agent proposes z next, then she should anticipate that the result will be the full
agenda (x; z; y) with outcome x. This embodies another part of the equilibrium denition:
agents should anticipate equilibrium continuations from extensions of an agenda. In this
case, no matter what happens after x, any continuation equilibrium must lead to the
outcome of x. This actually means that stopping at x can be an equilibrium. Whether
or not the other agendas that lead to x are also included as equilibrium continuations from
x, is something that is not mandated by our basic denitions of equilibrium. However,
a further consistency condition that we add would imply that the other agendas leading
to x would also be equilibria in this example.
9
With some of the basic ideas from this simple example in hand, let us now consider
the full denition of equilibrium agendas.
First, notice as in the above example, dening behavior at one agenda requires having
some notion of what will happen following various extensions of the given agenda. Thus,
the denition involves sets of continuation equilibria to be dened from each starting
point. This is necessarily a set of sets, where a set of continuation equilibria is specied
starting from each possible agenda.
We deliberately impose only weak requirements in dening equilibrium sets. Although
taking such an approach allows for various collections to satisfy the denition, these weak
requirements already have substantial implications for which outcomes might be reached.
A collection of sets of continuation equilibria is a collection fCE(a)g
a2A
, where
CE(a)  A(a) for each a 2 A, that satises the following properties.
10
Given fCE(a)g
a2A
, let
C
+
(a) = [
x=2a
CE((a; x)):
So C
+
(a) is the set of all continuation equilibria that could result if some alternative is
added to an existing agenda a.
11
A collection of continuation equilibrium sets satises the following for each a 2 A:
9
Interestingly, it would seem that Powell, who introduced the amendment y to the agenda (x; z)
would have actually preferred the outcome of that agenda (z) to the outcome of x that resulted from
the agenda (x; z; y) due to the addition of his amendment y. However, given that that if Powell had not
introduced the amendment y, then someone else would have liked to; Powell might as well have proposed
the amendment, especially as it was one that he and much of his constituency strongly cared about.
10
As mentioned above, we are taking X , V , and P as given and omit their notation as arguments in
CE. We will be explicit if these are varying.
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We remark that if a 2 A
m
, then C
+
(a) = ;. Under (CE1) and (CE2) below, this implies that
CE(a) = fag if a 2 A
m
.
9
(CE1) (Equilibrium Continuations) CE(a) is a nonempty subset of fag [ C
+
(a) and
(CE2) (Stopping Requirements) a 2 CE(a) if and only if V (a)R
i
V (a
0
) for all a
0
2 C
+
(a)
and for all i 2 N .
Part (CE1) is a sequential rationality condition that simply says that the possibilities
from any agenda a are either to stop at a, or to add a new alternative to the agenda
and then follow some continuation equilibrium from the resulting agenda. This is a
condition that essentially just requires that the sets of equilibria for dierent agendas
have some minimal relationship to each other: if agents anticipate that a
0
= (a; x; : : :)
is a continuation equilibrium starting at a, then they must also expect it to still be a
continuation equilibrium when they have reached (a; x).
Part (CE2) describes conditions under which it can be an equilibrium for agents to
`stop' at a. If every agent nds that V (a) is at least as good as the outcome corresponding
to any other possible continuation equilibrium, then no agent has an incentive to extend a.
Conversely, if some agent i nds the voting outcome corresponding to some continuation
equilibrium strictly preferred to V (a), then this i will rather make a proposal and follow
the preferred continuation equilibrium, and the agenda will not stop at a.
One of our main themes developed below is that these minimal conditions already
have some very strong implications and imply a great deal about sets of equilibria.
While imposing some restrictions on collections of sets of continuation equilibria,
conditions (CE1) and (CE2) can still allow for a multiplicity of collections of equilibrium
continuations that satisfy the denition. Essentially, (CE1) and (CE2) give us some weak
limitations on what can be in the set of equilibria, but they do not tell us much about
which agendas must be included in the set. Consistency (CE3), below, addresses this
issue.
We say that an agenda a
0
= (a; x; : : :) is rationalizable (relative to a) if a
0
2 C
+
(a)
and there exists i 2 N and a
00
2 CE(a) with either a
00
= (a; y; : : :) with y 6= x or a
00
= a
such that V (a
0
)R
i
V (a
00
).
The idea of rationalizability is that i proposes adding x to the agenda a under the
belief that it will result in the agenda a
0
, and that if i does not propose adding x then
instead the continuation would be a
00
. As a
00
is a continuation equilibrium, this belief can
be justied.
We say that a collection of sets of continuation equilibria is consistent if it satises
(CE3) (Consistency) If a
0
2 C
+
(a) is rationalizable, then a
0
2 CE(a). Conversely, if
a
0
= (a; x; : : :) 2 CE(a) and either a 2 CE(a) or a
00
= (a; y; : : :) 2 CE(a) for some
y 6= x, then a
0
is rationalizable.
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Part (CE3) is a consistency condition on the collections of sets of continuation equi-
libria. It says the equilibrium continuations are those which are rationalizable, subject to
two exceptions. One is that stopping is handled under (CE2), and so the rationalization
of a itself is already addressed. The second is that an equilibrium continuation agenda
does not need to be rationalizable if it is a \unique" equilibrium continuation. Note that
in this second case, the rst part of the condition implies that all agents unanimously
nd the outcomes under (a; x; : : :) preferred to stopping or adding any other alternative
to a.
Later, we come back to discuss other notions of rationalizability and consistency.
We point out some important aspects of the above denitions.
First, the denitions necessarily involve a whole collection of fCE(a)g, one set for
each a 2 A. This reects the forward-looking aspect of the denition. In order to know
what is an equilibrium starting at one agenda, one has to be able to anticipate what will
happen starting at extensions of that agenda.
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Second, there always exists at least one collection fCE(a)g satisfying (CE1)-(CE3),
which is easily seen via a backwards induction argument, starting with agendas of full
length, and then working back to smaller agendas.
Third, the set CE(a) is not always uniquely determined. That is, there may be several
dierent sets which satisfy conditions (CE1) and (CE2); even when consistency (CE3)
is imposed. This stems from the fact that the conditions are designed to be weak, to
specify conditions that an equilibrium set should satisfy, but not so strong as to always
uniquely determine that set. Again, this traces back to our deliberate avoidance of any
reliance on an ad hoc formulation of the proposal process. To see an easy example of
the potential multiplicity of equilibrium continuations, consider a somewhat degenerate
voting rule as follows.
Example 2 Multiple Collections of Sets of Continuation Equilibria:
Under V the outcome is always the second alternative proposed in the agenda (or the
rst if the agenda is a singleton), regardless of the preference prole. So V (a) = a
2
if
a 2 A
k
with k  2 and V (a) = a
1
if a 2 A
1
.
This is a peculiar voting rule, but one that allows for a simple illustration of the
multiplicity of equilibria. Note that in this case, CE(a) = A(a) is uniquely determined
for any a 2 A
k
for k  2. This follows since once the second alternative has been
proposed the outcome is already determined and the rest of the agenda is completely
irrelevant and so under (CE2) and (CE3) all continuations are then equilibria. Now
consider the outcome that is proposed in the second place in the agenda. In particular,
12
Of course, this is similar to a denition such as subgame perfect equilibrium where continuation
strategies must be specied for each possible subgame.
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let X = fw; x; y; zg and consider a preference prole where some agents have preferences
z, y, x, w, and others have preferences z, x, y, w; where the ordering species the strict
preferences where w is the worst alternative. Consider starting at the agenda a = fwg.
So, w is the status quo. Conditions (CE1) and (CE2) have only very weak implications
here: it cannot be an equilibrium to stop at fwg. Beyond that, they allow for a variety
of continuation equilibrium sets. Once consistency is added, however, things are tied
down to a greater degree. In particular, there are two sets which satisfy (CE1), (CE2)
and (CE3). The rst such set consists of all extensions of a with z in second place (i.e.,
CE(a) = A((w; z))); and the second such set consists of all extensions of a with any of
x, y, or z in second place (i.e., CE(a) = A((w; x)) [ A((w; y)) [ A((w; z))).
In this example, consistency (CE3) still does not uniquely tie things down. One might
argue that extensions of (w; z) are really the only sensible equilibrium continuations in
the above example, as they are unanimously preferred to proposals x and y. One may
wish to impose such additional conditions on the notion of equilibrium (and we discuss
this more fully in Section 6). However, as we shall see, if we restrict attention to more
sensible voting rules, such as those which satisfy a Pareto eÆciency condition, consistency
will already tie things down uniquely without the imposition of any additional conditions.
Given the potential multiplicity of collections of equilibria, we now show that in many
cases of interest the set of continuation equilibria is in fact uniquely determined under
consistency. This allows us to develop an equivalent denition that is not self-referential.
4 Equilibrium Agendas for Pareto EÆcient Voting
Rules
An alternative x 2 B  X is Pareto eÆcient relative to B if there does not exist y 2 B
such that yR
i
x for all i 2 N and yP
j
x for some j 2 N .
V is Pareto eÆcient if V (a) is Pareto eÆcient relative the alternatives in a for each
a 2 A.
Given a collection fCE(a)g
a2A
and any a 2 A, let PE
+
(a) denote the set of agendas
in C
+
(a) [ a that result in Pareto eÆcient alternatives (considering all of X).
Theorem 3 For any preference prole P 2 P and Pareto eÆcient voting rule V and
collection of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
, V (a
0
) is Pareto eÆcient (con-
sidering all alternatives) for all a and a
0
2 CE(a).
13
Moreover, if consistency is satised,
13
Theorem 3 also holds if one replaces Pareto eÆciency everywhere by weak Pareto eÆciency, where
an alternative x 2 B  X is weakly Pareto eÆcient relative to P and B if there does not exist y 2 B such
that yP
i
x for all i 2 N . This weakens the assumptions of the theorem, but then also the conclusions.
12
then fCE(a)g
a2A
is uniquely dened and described by
CE(a) =
(
PE
+
(a) if V (a)R
i
V (a
0
) 8i and a
0
2 C
+
(a)
PE
+
(a) n a otherwise.
The rst result in Theorem 3 is that equilibrium agendas of Pareto eÆcient voting
rules must result in outcomes that are Pareto eÆcient overall. This conclusion is not
quite as obvious as it seems. For instance, it could be that x is Pareto dominated by y,
but that V (a
0
) 6= y for all a
0
2 A(a). This means that since y is never in the range of V ,
it does not threaten x. The proof uses the fact that if y is added to an agenda containing
x, then the outcome cannot be x and must instead be some other outcome that some
voter prefers to x. Building on this reasoning we rule out equilibrium agendas leading to
x. The details are provided in the proof in the appendix.
The second result in Theorem 3 is that under consistency the continuation equilibria of
Pareto eÆcient voting rules are uniquely determined and described by a simple algorithm.
While Theorem 3 applies to eÆcient voting rules, some of the reasoning that lies
behind it can be used to understand outcomes of ineÆcient rules. The following Lemma
is one that is a key to the proofs of several results, and also can be applied to ineÆcient
voting procedures.
Lemma 4 Consider any P 2 P, a 2 A, and voting rule V . Suppose that [
b2A
Full
(a)
V (b) 
D, for some D  X such that if x; y 2 X, and x =2 D; y 2 D then 9i 2 N such that
yP
i
x. Under (CE1) and (CE2), V (a
0
) 2 D for any a
0
2 CE(a).
The idea behind the lemma is simple - if stopping at some agenda will lead to an
outcome outside of D, then there is some agent i who can gain by adding to the agenda
and getting some equilibrium continuation; and hence the only potential equilibrium
agendas must result in outcomes in D. Setting D equal to the set of Pareto eÆcient
alternatives results in the rst conclusion in Theorem 3. Setting D equal to other sets,
such as the top-cycle, uncovered set, etc., can also lead to interesting conclusions as we
shall see below.
Full-Agendas Sets
The implications of Theorem 3 are even stronger when preferences satisfy a mild
restriction.
Let P

be the set of all proles satisfying the restriction:
8x; y 2 X; 9i 2 N such that xP
i
y or yP
i
x:
So, P

is the set of proles such that it is never the case that all individuals are
indierent between some pair of alternatives x; y. Of course, this condition is satised
13
when individual preferences are strict, but also holds more generally including where
some transfers or distribution of resources are possible. In this case, we obtain a charac-
terization of continuation equilibrium outcomes that does not even require an inductive
denition.
14
Given a voting rule V and a status-quo, let the Full-Agendas Set FA
V
(a), be dened
by
FA
V
(a) = [
a
0
2A
Full
(a)
V (a
0
):
These are all the outcomes that can be reached when voting over the full-agenda exten-
sions of a.
A prominent example of a full-agendas set is the Banks Set (as detailed below), where
V is sophisticated voting by successive elimination. The Full-Agendas Set denition here
is the analog for any voting rule.
Theorem 5 Consider a Pareto eÆcient voting rule V and prole of preferences P 2
P

. If fCE(a)g
a2A
is a collection of sets of continuation equilibria, then the outcomes
corresponding to continuation equilibria following some agenda a are a subset of those
that can be found by considering only full length agendas that are extensions of a. That
is,
[
a
0
2CE(a)
V (a
0
)  FA
V
(a):
If in addition consistency is satised, then these sets are equal:
[
a
0
2CE(a)
V (a
0
) = FA
V
(a):
Theorem 5 shows how powerful the implications of the simple stopping condition are.
It states that the equilibrium outcomes correspond to those where complete agendas are
considered. The idea behind this follows an inductive proof. Suppose this is true once
an agenda is of length k or more. Now suppose that some agenda of length k   1 is an
equilibrium agenda and results in an outcome that diers from all full length agendas, and
thus all continuation equilibria if any outcome is added. Given Pareto eÆciency, some
agent must prefer some outcome of a longer agenda that is a continuation equilibrium if
some alternative is added to the current agenda to that of stopping. Then (CE2) implies
that stopping cannot be an equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 5 is in the Appendix. The second half of the proof actu-
ally follows from a stronger claim which does not invoke Pareto eÆciency of the voting
procedure. Since this is of independent interest, we state it here.
15
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To see an example of why this condition is needed in the theorem, consider a situation where all
voters are indierent between all alternatives, and when there is a tie in voting the last item in the agenda
wins. It can be an equilibrium to stop at any agenda (including the status quo) given full indierence,
and yet the status-quo can never be reached by a full length agenda.
15
In fact we prove stronger statements in the appendix, showing that even for ineÆcient voting rules
there is a minimal consistent set of equilibria (in terms of set inclusion), which corresponds to the
denition under the algorithm above. It is under Pareto eÆciency that this must coincide with all
consistent sets of equilibria.
14
Claim 6 For any voting procedure V , preference prole P 2 P and a 2 A, if fCE(a)g
a2A
is a collection of sets of continuation equilibria satisfying consistency, then any Pareto
eÆcient alternative that can be reached via some full length continuation of a is an
equilibrium continuation outcome following a at P .
16
5 Applications to Specic Voting Rules and Settings
In order to demonstrate the implications and usefulness of Theorems 3 and 5, we apply
them to a number of settings including some prominent ones.
5.1 Order Independent Voting Rules
A voting rule V is order independent if V (a) = V (a
0
) whenever fx 2 ag = fx 2 a
0
g.
Order independent voting rules are those for which the ordering of the agenda does
not matter. Neutral voting rules are order independent, but there are also important
order independent voting rules that are non-neutral. Consider the following example:
candidates are people who are seeded according to their age (or experience, rank, etc.).
Regardless of the order in which they are proposed or nominated, the two youngest can-
didates are voted upon, then the winner of that vote is pitted against the next youngest,
etc.. This rule is independent of the order in which the candidates are proposed, and
yet it is still a sequential rule and is clearly not neutral. Therefore, we emphasize that
\order independence" refers only to the order of the agenda and does not mean that the
voting rule itself is not based on some implicit ordering of alternatives.
Note that for any order independent voting rule, V (a) = V (a
0
) for any a and a
0
in
A
m
. With an abuse of notation, we write this outcome as V (X).
The following is a direct corollary of Theorem 5.
Corollary 7 For any Pareto eÆcient and order independent voting rule V , preference
prole of preferences P 2 P

, collection of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
(i.e., satisfying (CE1) and (CE2)), and agenda a 2 A, there is a unique continuation
equilibrium outcome
[
a
0
2CE(a)
V (a
0
) = V (X):
An important remark about Corollary 7 is that it does not require consistency, but
follows from (CE1) and (CE2) in the denition.
The following example shows how Borda's rule is covered under Corollary 7.
16
Since we show in the appendix that there is a minimal consistent set of equilibria (in terms of set
inclusion), this must hold for the minimal consistent set of equilibria.
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Example 8 Borda Voting.
Voters' preferences are :
 xP
1
wP
1
yP
1
z
 xP
2
wP
2
yP
2
z
 zP
3
wP
3
yP
3
x
Voting is (sincere) voting according to Borda's rule. An alternative receives three
points for a rst place ranking in a voter's preferences, two points for a second place
ranking, one point for a third place ranking, and no points for a fourth place ranking;
and the alternative with the highest score is the outcome (with ties broken according to
any deterministic rule). These are adjusted for the restricted ranking if some subset of
alternatives is considered.
This is a Pareto eÆcient and order independent voting rule.
It is easily checked that w wins whenever it is on the agenda. Also, x wins if it is
present but w is not. If just y and z are present, then y wins. z only wins if it is the only
proposed alternative.
Corollary 7 implies that the outcome of any equilibrium agenda must be w in this
example. Indeed, it is easily seen that no agenda leading to y or z can be an equilibrium,
as adding w to the agenda will lead to a continuation equilibrium outcome of w which
would be preferred over y or z by some agent. Similarly, if an agenda leads to x, then
adding w will lead to a continuation equilibrium of w, which is better for voter 3 than x.
5.2 Tournaments and Top Cycle Consistent Rules
The following denitions are useful in some of the remaining applications.
Tournaments
In many contexts, the preferences of the voters can be summarized (even for strategic
purposes) by the majority voting relation that is induced over pairs of alternatives. A
tournament is a binary relation that summarizes the important aspects of voters' pref-
erences in some contexts.
17
More formally, the majority voting tournament is dened as
follows.
17
See Laslier [11] for an illuminating account of the principal results in the vast literature on tourna-
ments.
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Given P 2 P, denote by T (P ) the binary relation dened by
xT (P )y , # fi 2 N : xP
i
yg > # fi 2 N : yP
i
xg
Again, we omit the notation on P and simply write T .
T is always asymmetric and if n is odd and individual preferences are strict then T
is complete. If we break ties in some deterministic manner, then even in cases with an
even number of voters or indierences T is also complete, and therefore a tournament (an
asymmetric and complete binary relation). In what follows, unless specied otherwise,
we will assume that ties are broken so that T is complete. T is referred to as the majority
tournament (induced by P ).
The Top Cycle
As the majority tournament is not necessarily transitive, it can have cycles. A promi-
nent cycle that we refer to in the sequel is the top cycle associated with a tournament.
The top cycle of T , denoted by TC(X; T ) is the set fx 2 X : 8y 2 X; 9x
1
; : : : ; x
k
in X such that x
1
=
x; x
k
= y and x
i
Tx
i+1
8i = 1; : : : ; k   1g i.e. the set of alternatives that can reach any
other alternative in X via a T -chain of arbitrary length. For subsets of alternatives,
B  X, there is a corresponding denition and we denote that set TC(B; T ). When
there is no B  X indicated, then we are referring to the top cycle relative to X, and
we use the notation TC(a; T ) to denote the top cycle relative to the set of alternatives
in the agenda a under the tournament T .
A voting rule is top cycle consistent at a tournament T if V (a) 2 TC(a; T ) for any
a 2 A.
Condorcet Winners and Consistency
An alternative fxg is a Condorcet winner relative to B  X if TC(B; T ) = fxg. That
is, a Condorcet winner is an alternative that beats every other alternative in B under T .
A voting rule V is Condorcet consistent if V (a) selects a Condorcet winner whenever
one exists relative to T and the alternatives in a.
5.3 Equilibrium Agendas for Top Cycle and Condorcet Con-
sistent Voting Rules
If the voting procedure V arises from strategic voting on a binary tree, then it follows
from McKelvey and Niemi (1978) that V is top cycle consistent. Thus, the following
proposition covers a wide variety of applications.
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Proposition 9 Consider a P such that T (P ) is a well-dened tournament and a collec-
tion of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
(i.e., satisfying (CE1) and (CE2)). If
V is top cycle consistent, then all equilibrium outcomes following any agenda are in the
(overall) top cycle. Moreover, if V is Condorcet consistent and there exists a Condorcet
winner x at P , then all of the equilibrium continuations from any agenda lead to x.
Again, remark that Proposition 9 does not require consistency (CE3).
The second statement does not quite follow from the rst, since Condorcet consistency
does not imply top cycle consistency. The proof of Proposition 9 is straightforward for the
case where the preference proles in P

are strict and the voting rule is Pareto eÆcient.
Then, from Theorem 5 we know that the equilibrium outcomes coincide with those that
are full agendas and extensions of the starting agenda. These must select from the top
cycle. The proof when the preference proles are not necessarily in P

or the voting rule
is ineÆcient is slightly more complicated, as then Theorem 5 cannot be applied. The
proof is still relatively short and appears in the appendix.
A direct corollary of Proposition 9 is that all equilibrium agendas in a setting with
single-peaked preferences and a Condorcet consistent voting rule lead to the outcome of
the median of the voters'
peaks.
5.4 Voting by Successive Elimination and Equilibrium Agendas
The voting procedure of voting by successive elimination is dened as follows. Consider
some agenda a 2 A and let a = (x
1
; : : : ; x
k
). In the successive elimination procedure, a
vote is rst taken to eliminate either x
k
or x
k 1
. The `winning' alternative from the rst
round is compared to x
k 2
, and a vote is taken to eliminate either surviving alternative
from the rst vote or x
k 2
, and so on. After (k   1) comparisons, the last surviving
alternative is declared to be the voting outcome.
At each stage, the elimination of one alternative is according to majority voting. This
is well-specied when T is complete. However, in cases where there are ties under the
majority preference relation, either resulting from personal indierences or from an even
number of voters, T is not complete. In this case, voting by successive elimination needs
to be more completely specied.
We do so as follows. At each stage allow individuals to vote for one of the two
alternatives or to abstain (in the case where they may be indierent). In case of a tie in
the voting between alternatives x
i
and x
j
, x
i
is elected if and only if x
i
comes before x
j
in the ordering of voting (i < j). This favors alternatives proposed earlier in the agenda
under ties, which is a natural way to break ties (given that they have not already been
broken under T ).
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At the last stage of voting, if the voting boils down to a comparison of x and y where
x precedes y in the successive elimination procedure, then x wins if not yT (P )x and y
wins otherwise.
However, in order to determine the eventual voting outcome, it is also necessary to
describe how voters act. We rst examine the case where they vote strategically at each
stage, and so focus on the sophisticated voting outcome of this binary voting procedure.
This is the outcome under the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies that
has been well-studied (see Shepsle and Weingast (1984) for the algorithm identifying the
outcome).
18
Let S(a) denote the sophisticated voting outcome under voting by successive elimi-
nation on agenda a, as described above.
The Banks Set
The Banks set is then the Full-Agendas Set for sophisticated voting by successive
elimination (denoted S):
BS(a) = FA
S
(a):
19
Equilibrium Agendas and Voting by Successive Elimination
Given that sophisticated voting by successive elimination is a Pareto eÆcient voting
rule, we have the following corollary of Theorem 5.
Corollary 10 Consider a collection of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
(sat-
isfying (CE1) and (CE2)) and any prole of preferences P 2 P

. For all a 2 A,
[
a
0
2CE(a)
S(a
0
)  BS(a);
and if consistency (CE3) is also satised, then
[
a
0
2CE(a)
S(a
0
; P ) = BS(a):
Note that the result above also holds if we set the starting agenda a to be the emp-
tyset.
20
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The Shepsle-Weingast algorithm was dened for the case where T is complete. Our procedure of
breaking possible ties in the majority preference relation coming earlier in the ordering a ensures that
the sophisticated outcome can be derived from a straightforward variation on the algorithm derived by
Shepsle and Weingast.
19
Banks' (1985) denition was not relative to a status-quo agenda. Simply setting a = ; provides his
original denition.
20
An easy way to see this is simply to extend the set of alternatives to include some x
0
such that all
alternatives are preferred to x
0
by all agents under P , and then set a = fx
0
g and then apply the theorem
as it stands.
19
Corollary 10 states that not only does the Banks' set capture the set of outcomes that
could arise from arbitrary full length agendas, but that these are also precisely the set of
potential equilibrium outcomes when the agendas are endogenous.
While Corollary 10 provides a precise characterization of equilibrium agenda outcomes
for an important voting procedure, it is still useful to show that this characterization
completely ties down the outcome in some interesting cases. We now show this in the
context of an interesting \pork barrel politics" setting. In particular, even though in
some cases the top cycle of the majority voting relation may be very large, the Banks
set, and thus the set of equilibrium agenda outcomes, can be a singleton.
5.5 Voting over Projects
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey (1987) consider the following model. N is a set of
legislators (with n odd), each of whom has a project for their constituency. The projects
have value only for their constituents, but the cost of a project, if it is undertaken, is split
evenly among all constituencies.
21
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey assume that projects
have dierent costs, so as to ensure that T (P ) is complete, but that is not assumed here
(as we can extend their result given our procedure for breaking ties).
So, this is a model of pure \pork-barrel" politics. Here the set of alternatives X
is simply a list of which projects are undertaken, and so X = f0; 1g
n
. Voting over an
agenda is done by sophisticated voting by successive elimination.
Given this setting, legislators' preferences take a specic form. Their favorite alterna-
tive is to have their own project undertaken and no other projects undertaken. Beyond
the decision concerning a legislator's own project, he or she simply prefers to minimize
the costs of the other projects undertaken. The critical freedom in the preferences is in
the relative costs of projects, which determines which projects a legislator might tolerate
being undertaken in conjunction with his or her own, before the cost becomes so high
that he or she would prefer to have none built at
all.
An interesting aspect of the Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey (1987) model is the
importance of a status quo. The status quo is that no projects are undertaken. Applying
our equilibrium approach to this model is of particular interest as it shows how the
status quo can tie down equilibrium agendas, and illustrates why we have been careful
to dened continuation equilibrium concepts that allow for a status quo. It also shows
that the conclusions reached by Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey (1987) without an
equilibrium analysis, are robust to an equilibrium formulation.
21
This assumption is not necessary. All that matters is that the legislators agree about the relative
rankings of how costly (in terms of how much they each pay) dierent projects are.
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Let X

denote the set of x 2 X that (i) undertake exactly
n+1
2
projects, (ii) are as
cheap as any other choice of exactly
n+1
2
projects, and (iii) are such that xT0. This may
be empty.
Corollary 11 Consider any prole of admissible preferences P 2 P and collection of sets
of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
(satisfying (CE1) and (CE2)) in the extension of
the Ferejohn, Fiorina, and McKelvey setting where some projects may have identical
costs.
22
[
a
0
2CE(a
0
)
S(a
0
) =

X

if X

6= ;
0 otherwise.
Here the equilibrium agendas result in collections of projects corresponding to ma-
jorities of minimal size and which choose the cheapest projects. This minimal winning
size is an interesting qualitative feature which has been extensively discussed in various
areas of political science since Riker (1962). The proof of Corollary 11 appears in the
appendix.
Let us emphasize here that the equilibrium predictions here are quite narrow. For
many natural preference proles, the Top-Cycle here is the entire set of alternatives, and
in fact the Uncovered Set is nearly all of the alternatives. Thus, equilibrium agenda
reasoning narrows the predictions dramatically from what one might predict simply by
examining the tournament itself and a set based on the top-cycle, uncovered set, etc..
This also shows that in situations where a chaos-theorem type of reasoning would say
that no prediction is possible, equilibrium considerations can still be quite powerful and
predictive.
To see this explicitly, consider a situation where there are three dierent constituen-
cies. Suppose that project 1 is cheaper than project 2 is cheaper than project 3. To keep
things simple, also suppose that any legislator prefers to have all projects built to having
none built. So for instance, [1,1,1] (all projects being built) is preferred to [0,0,0] (no
projects being built). This results in the following majority voting relationship:
[0; 0; 0] beats [1; 0; 0], [0; 1; 0], and [0; 0; 1]
[1; 0; 0] beats [0; 1; 0], [0; 0; 1], [1; 1; 0] and [1; 0; 1]
[0; 1; 0] beats 0; 0; 1], [1; 1; 0] and [0; 1; 1]
[0; 0; 1] beats [1; 0; 1] and [0; 1; 1]
[1; 1; 0] beats [0; 0; 0], [1; 1; 1], [0; 1; 1], [1; 0; 1], and [0; 0; 1]
[1; 0; 1] beats [0; 0; 0], [1; 1; 1], [0; 1; 1], and [0; 1; 0]
[0; 1; 1] beats [0; 0; 0], [1; 1; 1] and [1; 0; 0]
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Note that the preference prole will naturally end up in P

under their assumptions.
21
[1; 1; 1] beats [0; 0; 0], [1; 0; 0], [0; 1; 0], and [0; 0; 1].
This is pictured in the following gure
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The corresponding Top Cycle is all of the alternatives. The Uncovered set here is all
of the alternatives except [0; 0; 1]. Yet the outcome identied under equilibrium agenda
formation (Corollary 11) is simply the singleton [1; 1; 0].
5.6 Sincere Voting and an Absence of Chaos
The previous results show that equilibrium conditions on agendas can make narrow pre-
dictions. The examples we worked out in detail so far used sophisticated voting. As
much of the literature on chaos theorems (e.g., McKelvey (1979)) was restricted to sin-
cere voting we show that equilibrium reasoning can also be predictive there. In particular,
we show that even in situations where the top cycle is large (even the whole set of al-
ternatives), considering only equilibrium agendas still narrows the set of predictions in
well-dened ways.
The marriage of equilibrium agenda formation with sincere voting is a bit schizophrenic.
On the one hand, we are analyzing sophisticated (forward looking) agenda formation,
while on the other hand, we assume myopic voting. The reason we undertake this ex-
ercise of applying our equilibrium agenda formation to sincere voting is to revisit the
chaos-theorem setting as closely as possible to understand where the departure in con-
clusions comes from, show the versatility of the equilibrium reasoning, and show the
robustness of the claim that equilibrium reasoning in agenda formation oers narrow
predictions.
While the setting we consider in this section is a nite one (see the next section for
the innite case), we can still see the essence of chaos theorems in the following way.
Consider sincere voting by successive elimination, where when asked to compare any two
alternatives, voters vote for the one that they prefer, not anticipating the outcome of the
votes yet to come in the sequence.
23
The critical observation is that for any x 2 TC(T )
23
One might also term this myopic voting. Note, however, that this corresponds to sophisticated
voting under the following alternative voting rule. The closely related voting procedure for which this
is sophisticated is as follows. On an agenda a = (x
1
; : : : ; x
K
), select x
1
unless a majority votes to move
on to x
2
; then select x
2
unless a majority votes to move on to x
3
, and so forth. Sophisticated voting
on this rule can be solved as follows. If one gets to the last decision of whether or not to select x
K 1
or move on, then the vote will be a sincere vote between x
K
and x
K 1
. Anticipating this, the previous
vote is a sincere vote between x
K 2
and the sincere winner between x
K
and x
K 1
. Rolling this back up
the voting tree, this is solved exactly as a sincere vote by successive elimination.
22
and any k, there exists an agenda a 2 A
k
, such that V (a) = x, where V is sincere voting
by successive elimination. In particular, setting k = m, any x in the top cycle can be
reached by at least one full length agenda (in fact at least two).
24
This means that if we
are not able to do any selection over agendas, then any alternative in the top cycle can
be an outcome.
25
The following example, however, illustrates that our denition of equilibrium selects
from the agendas. Here only a subset of the top cycle alternatives are equilibrium out-
comes, even though all alternatives (other than a unanimously bad status quo) are in
the top cycle. Thus, the notion of equilibrium does preclude alternatives and makes
selections from the top cycle.
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Example 12
Voters' preferences are :
 x
5
P
1
x
2
P
1
x
3
P
1
x
4
P
1
x
1
P
1
x
0
 x
4
P
2
x
5
P
2
x
1
P
2
x
2
P
2
x
3
P
2
x
0
 x
3
P
3
x
4
P
3
x
5
P
3
x
1
P
3
x
2
P
3
x
0
The induced tournament T is that
 x
5
beats x
0
, x
1
, x
2
, and x
3
,
 x
4
beats x
0
, x
1
, x
2
, and x
5
,
 x
3
beats x
0
, x
1
, and x
4
,
 x
2
beats x
0
and x
3
,
 x
1
beats x
0
and x
2
.
Note that here BS(fx
0
g) = fx
3
; x
4
; x
5
g and TC(X) = fx
1
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
5
g; and also
that both x
4
and x
5
Pareto dominate x
1
.
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A recipe is as follows. Find an ordering of the K alternatives in the top cycle x = x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
K
,
such that x
i
T (P )x
i+1
for each i < K. Such an ordering always exists. Consider any agenda where the
top cycle alternatives maintain this relative ordering and the other alternatives fall in any place. Sincere
voting by successive elimination will lead to x. The second variation is to switch the position of x
K
and
x
K 1
, which does not aect the outcome.
25
Note that sophisticated behavior in voting by successive elimination can preclude some alternatives
from the top cycle as ever being equilibrium outcomes as we already saw in Corollary 10.
26
In light of Footnote 23 and Proposition 9, equilibria under sincere voting by successive elimination
will always end up in the top cycle, and so the example shows it can end up being a strict subset that
is selected.
23
Under sincere voting by successive elimination, the agendas (with a status quo of x
0
)
that can lead to an outcome of x
1
are those that follow the ordering of the index of the
alternatives without gaps, starting at x
0
, except possibly that the last two alternatives
may be switched.
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None of these are equilibrium agendas when the status quo is a = fx
0
g (i.e., none
of these are in CE(fx
0
g)). Thus, x
1
is not an equilibrium agenda outcome when V is
sincere voting by successive elimination.
First, it is easily checked that fx
0
; x
1
g and fx
0
; x
2
; x
1
g, are not continuation equilib-
rium agendas (i.e., stopping once they are reached), as adding x
5
will lead to an outcome
of either x
4
or x
5
which are unanimously preferred to x
1
; and so (CE2) is violated. Thus
they could not be equilibrium agendas beginning at x
0
. We can also check that the
agenda fx
0
; x
1
; x
3
; x
2
g is not a continuation equilibrium. If either x
5
or x
4
is added one
obtains either x
3
as the only equilibrium outcome.
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Then it cannot be an equilibrium
to stop, as voters 1 or 3 would gain by proposing either x
4
or x
5
.
The agendas that remain to be checked that might lead to x
1
are those inA(fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g).
Note that for any a
0
2 A(fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
g), the outcome is x
1
, while for any a 2 A(fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
5
g)
the outcome x
4
or x
5
. Thus, consistency (CE3) implies that if x
1
is an equilibrium
outcome following fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, then also x
4
or x
5
is an equilibrium outcome following
fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, and that x
1
can only come from proposing x
3
next. Also, note that x
3
is not
an outcome under any agenda in A(fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g) as it loses to x
2
, and also x
2
and x
0
are
never outcomes under any agendas in A(fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g). Then by (CE3) it follows that x
1
is not an equilibrium outcome following fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, and those equilibrium outcomes are
a subset of fx
4
; x
5
g.
The example uses the fact that agendas that lead to x
1
must have x
1
in one of the
rst three places in the agenda. This always leaves additional alternatives that can be
proposed that would lead to other outcomes, and the preference for some of these other
outcomes prevents the specic agendas leading to x
1
from being equilibrium agendas.
Thus, chaos is avoided and we have predictions that we end up inside a strict subset
of the top cycle.
In fact, we also have a \lower bound" on the set of possible outcomes of sincere voting
under sequential elimination - Claim 1 in the appendix implies that all Pareto optimal
elements in the top cycle can be supported as outcomes of continuation equilibria.
Finally, we show that equilibrium agendas under sincere voting under sequential elim-
ination can lead to Pareto ineÆcient outcomes.
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Explicitly, the agendas leading to an outcome of x
1
are fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
; x
5
; x
4
g, fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
5
g,
fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
g, fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
4
; x
3
g, fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
g, fx
0
; x
1
; x
3
; x
2
g, fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
g, fx
0
; x
2
; x
1
g, and
fx
0
; x
1
g.
28
By reasoning similar to that above, it is easily checked that if x
5
is added next, then x
4
would be
also added next in equilibrium.
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Example 13
Let X = fx
0
; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
5
g. The status quo is x
0
. There are 3 individuals, with
preferences given below.
 x
1
P
1
x
2
P
1
x
5
P
1
x
3
P
1
x
4
P
1
x
0
 x
5
P
2
x
3
P
2
x
4
P
2
x
1
P
2
x
2
P
1
x
0
 x
4
P
3
x
1
P
3
x
5
P
3
x
2
P
3
x
3
P
1
x
0
The induced tournament T is :
 x
1
beats x
0
, x
2
, x
3
, and x
5
,
 x
2
beats x
0
and x
3
,
 x
3
beats x
0
and x
4
,
 x
4
beats x
0
, x
1
and x
2
,
 x
5
beats x
0
, x
2
, x
3
and x
4
.
Note that x
2
is Pareto dominated by x
1
.
Let us argue that a = (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
1
) which results in x
2
is in CE(fx
0
g). Since
adding x
5
makes no dierence to the outcome, this is an equilibrium agenda once a is
reached. Moving back, a is an equilibrium continuation of (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
). If instead x
5
is added so to get (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
5
), then it will not be an equilibrium to stop as the
outcome would be x
5
and agent 1 would prefer to add x
1
so that the outcome would
again be x
2
. Thus, all equilibrium continuations of (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
) lead to x
2
.
Next, note that a
0
= (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
; x
5
; x
4
; x
1
) results in x
5
, which is voter 2's favorite.
Thus, we know that it is possible to reach (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
). Then under (CE3), voter 1 is
willing to propose x
4
expecting the continuation of a leading to x
2
, given that there is
another continuation equilibrium leading to x
5
. As argued above, we then have a as an
equilibrium continuation once (x
0
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
) has been reached.
Thus x
2
is an equilibrium outcome when the status quo is x
0
.
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5.7 Handling Innities
Our discussion so far has focused on a nite set of alternatives X. We now demonstrate
how our analysis works in more general settings where the set of alternatives may be in-
nite. An important rst remark is that the denitions we have for continuation equilibria,
(CE1)-(CE3), can be applied directly to the innite case without modication.
However, there are new challenges that arise in applying the denition of equilibria
in innite settings, which we will address below. One challenge is whether or not to
dene voting rules on innite sequences of alternatives, and if it is done, how to do it.
There are dierent ways that this might be done and the specic choice of how to do it
is usually specic to the setting in question. Another challenge is to establish existence
of equilibrium sets. In the nite case existence was straightforward as we could follow a
simple backward induction argument. In the innite case the issue is more subtle and
will require using some characteristics of the setting being analyzed. A third challenge
is that even when collections of sets of agenda equilibria can be shown to exist, it may
still be hard to get a handle on a characterization of them as, again, a simply backward
induction approach is precluded.
Nevertheless, despite these challenges the denitions turn out to be quite manageable
in several ways as we now show.
Consider an innite X. Let A = [
k
A
k
be now the set of arbitrary length nite
agendas.
29
Given a voting rule V , say that an agenda a 2 A is maximal if V (a
0
) = V (a) for all
a
0
2 A(a). Denote the set of maximal agendas for V that are the continuation of some a
by M
V
(a).
The analogue of Theorem 5 now follows.
First, we show that when the set of maximal agendas is nonempty, then there exists
a natural set of continuation equilibria.
Lemma 14 Consider an innite X, a prole of preferences P 2 P

, and a Pareto
eÆcient voting rule V such that M
V
(a) is nonempty for all agendas a 2 A. Then there
exists a collection of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
satisfying (CE1)-(CE3),
which is to set CE(a) =M
V
(a) for each a.
Lemma 14 leaves open the question of when M
V
(a) is nonempty for all agendas.
This is easy to check in some cases as when there is a Condorcet winner, and can also be
29
Here we could extend a voting rule V to be dened over innite agendas, but it is not necessary. For
the interested reader, one way of dening V over innite agendas is as follows. Consider an innite a,
and let a
k
be the agenda consisting of the rst k proposed alternatives. If there exists some K such that
V (a
k
) = V (a
K
) for all k  K, then dene V (a) = V (a
K
). Have some rule for assigning V (a) otherwise,
such as xing a status quo x and if voting never resolves itself then the status quo stays in place.
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veried in some settings such as the three person divide-the-dollar game analyzed by Penn
(2001). We leave the exploration of more subtle conditions guaranteeing nonemptiness
for future research.
Now we can establish the analog of Theorem 5 for the innite case.
Theorem 15 Consider an innite X, a prole of preferences P 2 P

, and a Pareto
eÆcient voting rule V such that M
V
(a) is nonempty for all agendas a 2 A. For any
collection of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
(satisfying (CE1) and (CE2)),
and any nite a 2 A,
[
a
0
2CE(a)
V (a
0
)  [
b2M
V
(a)
V (b);
and if consistency (CE3) is also satised, then
[
a
0
2CE(a)
V (a
0
) = [
b2M
V
(a)
V (b):
The proof of Theorem15 is provided in the appendix. Here, we provide the basic
intuition. The proof of Theorem 5 exploited the possibility of backward induction from
agendas a 2 A
m
. Notice that if a is a maximal agenda, then all b 2 A(a) can essentially be
ignored. Hence, maximal agendas play the same role in the innite setting that agendas
in A
Full
(a) play in the nite environment.
6 Discussion of the Denition of Equilibrium
Proposals to Stop the Agenda or Seconds to Continue an Agenda
Some procedures may allow an individual to propose a motion that voting take place
immediately on the existing agenda. This motion is voted \yes" or \no", and a majority
support can stop the existing agenda. Alternatively, a procedure may require at least
two agents to support a proposal in order to add it to the agenda.
If either of these variations are present, it makes no dierence to the analysis, at least
under sophisticated voting by successive elimination. Let us oer a heuristic argument
for why Corollary 16 extends in this way.
We argue by induction. It is clearly true starting at some full length agenda. Suppose
it is true starting at agendas of length at least k+1. Consider an existing agenda a 2 A
k
,
S(a) = x, and individual i proposes the motion that voting take place immediately. If
i's motion is defeated, then her proposal is irrelevant. On the other hand, if i's motion
is accepted, then x becomes the nal outcome. This implies that a majority prefers x to
any outcome that can be obtained by some further continuation equilibrium, which from
the induction step and the corollary corresponds to the outcome of some a
0
2 A(a)\A
m
.
If x already corresponds to such an outcome, then the claim is true. If not, then by the
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Shepsle-Weingast algorithm, there must be some alternative y =2 a such that y is preferred
by a majority to x and such that y is the outcome under a continuation equilibrium
a
0
2 A(a) \ A
m
. This, however, implies that a majority would vote to continue rather
than stop at x, which would be a contradiction. Thus the claim is true.
The argument for having a second agent move a proposal to make it part of an agenda
is analogous, noting that if a majority prefer y to x, then at least two agents must prefer
to follow the continuation equilibrium leading to y rather than stopping at x.
Modications of Consistency
The notion of consistency (CE3) is one that produces a large set of equilibria relative
to those which might be considered (witness Theorem 5 and Claim 6). We now consider
a more stringent form of rationalizability, that in turn corresponds to a dierent form of
consistency that includes fewer continuation equilibria.
We say that an agenda a
0
= (a; x; : : :) is strongly rationalizable (relative to a) if
a
0
2 C
+
(a) and
there exists i 2 N such that for any y =2 a and y 6= x there exists some a
00
2 CE((a; y))
such that V (a
0
)R
i
V (a
00
), and if a 2 CE(a) then also V (a
0
)R
i
V (a).
Strong rationalizability only allows for an agenda (a; x; : : :) which is a continuation
of a to be supported only if there is some agent who does not prefer all equilibrium
continuations of (a; y) to those of (a; x). The idea being that an agent who prefers
all continuations of (a; y) to those of (a; x) would not propose x, but would instead
propose y (or possibly some other alternative). This diers from rationalizability, in that
rationalizability allows some i to propose x if there is some alternative continuation that
the agent nds worse; but this does not consider the fact that the agent might prefer to
propose something else in y's place.
We say that a collection of sets of continuation equilibria is strongly consistent if it
satises
30
(CE4) (Strong Consistency) If a
0
2 C
+
(a) is strongly rationalizable, then a
0
2 CE(a).
Conversely, if a
0
= (a; x; : : :) 2 CE(a) and either a 2 CE(a) or a
00
= (a; y; : : :) 2
CE(a) for some y 6= x, then a
0
is strongly rationalizable.
Let us make a couple of remarks. First, sets of continuation equilibria satisfying
(CE1), (CE2), and (CE4) always exist. This can be seen by noting that starting from
30
When we modify (CE3) to (CE4), we might also consider adding another condition, which was
implied under (CE1), (CE2) and (CE3), but not under (CE1), (CE2) and (CE4). The condition is (5)
If (a; x; : : :) 2 CE(a)
then CE((a; x))  CE(a). This is irrelevant in the discussion below.
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some agenda either there exists some strongly rationalizable alternative (possibly several)
or else a must be the equilibrium continuation. Second, from Theorem 3 we know that for
Pareto eÆcient rules continuation equilibria satisfying strong consistency (CE4) always
are a subset of those satisfying consistency (CE3). Example 1 is easily seen to be one
where this is a strict subset. However, that is an ineÆcient voting rule. The following
example shows that the selection may be strict even for sophisticated voting by successive
elimination, where strong consistency results in a strict subset of the Banks' set.
Example 16
Let X = fx
1
; x
2
; x
3
; x
4
; x
5
g and N = f1; 2; 3g.
The preference prole is:
 x
1
P
1
x
3
P
1
x
2
P
1
x
4
P
1
x
5
 x
5
P
2
x
3
P
2
x
4
P
2
x
1
P
2
x
2
 x
2
P
3
x
4
P
3
x
5
P
3
x
1
P
3
x
3
Then, the induced tournament T is
 x
4
beats x
1
and x
5
.
 x
1
beats x
2
and x
3
.
 x
2
beats x
4
and x
5
.
 x
3
beats x
2
and x
4
.
 x
5
beats x
1
and x
3
.
Then, BS(fx
0
g) = X. We want to show that if CE(fx
0
g) satisfy (CE1),(CE2) and
strong consistency, then the equilibrium outcomes are fx
1
; x
2
; x
5
g.
First, note that if a 2 C
+
(fx
0
; x
1
g), then S(a) = x
4
. For if a 2 A(fx
1
g), the
possible outcomes are in fx
5
; x
4
g. But since x
4
beats x
5
, (CE2) implies that S(a) = x
4
if a 2 C
+
(fx
0
; x
1
g).
Analogously, the following are true.
 If a 2 C
+
(fx
0
; x
2
g), then S(a) = x
1
.
 If a 2 C
+
(fx
0
; x
5
g), then S(a) = x
2
.
 If a 2 C
+
(fx
0
; x
3
g), then S(a) = x
5
.
 If a 2 C
+
(fx
0
; x
4
g; P ), then S(a) = x
3
.
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The proof is completed by showing that no one wants to propose x
1
or x
4
initially.
This must be true since 1 prefers to propose x
2
initially. This guarantees choice of
x
1
, which is 1's most preferred element in X. Similarly, 2 and 3 prefer initial proposals
of x
3
and x
5
respectively.
6.1 EÆciency under an IneÆcient Voting Rule!
It is interesting to note that equilibrium agenda formation can actually improve outcomes
of some voting procedures. Here is one such example.
Example 17 Voting to Admit Members to a Society.
Consider the election of individuals to a society, as studied by Barbera, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou (1991). Voters are current members of the society and they can nominate any
individuals for consideration. The voting rule is then an approval rule with a quota.
That is, voters can cast votes for any of the nominated individuals, and as many as they
like, and then the admitted individuals are those receiving at least the required quota of
votes.
To better understand this, let us consider a situation with two voters, f1; 2g, and
two candidates who might be considered for the society, fc
1
; c
2
g. In this case, the
set of possible outcomes is the set of possible new admissions to the society, X =
f[;]; [c
1
]; [c
2
]; [c
1
; c
2
]g. So here, [] is an outcome that identies  as the newly admit-
ted candidates to the society. The status quo agenda is a = ([;]).
Interestingly, such voting procedures are strategy-proof (under some restrictions on
the separability of preferences - candidates are goods or bads, independent of who else
might be elected); but they are not eÆcient.
To see why consider the following preferences of the voters
fc
1
gP
1
;P
1
fc
1
; c
2
gP
1
fc
2
g
and
fc
2
gP
2
;P
2
fc
1
; c
2
gP
2
fc
1
g.
So, voter 1 likes c
1
but dislikes c
2
, and dislikes c
2
more than he likes c
1
; that is, enough
so that voter 1 would prefer that nobody be elected to having both c
1
and c
2
be elected.
Voter 2's preferences are similar, except in liking c
2
and disliking c
1
.
Consider the voting rule where there is a quota of 1 - so basically, if a voter likes
a candidate then he can unilaterally make sure that the candidate is elected. If both
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candidates are on the agenda, then it will be a dominant strategy for each voter to vote
for his preferred candidate. That is, voter 1 will vote for c
1
and voter 2 will vote for c
2
.
The outcome of this is [c
1
; c
2
], so that both candidates are admitted. Yet, both voters
would prefer ;. Thus, the voting rule is ineÆcient.
Let us now consider endogenizing the agenda process. Equilibrium reasoning can
help restore eÆciency. Before providing the formal details, let us discuss the basic intu-
ition. We begin with the status quo of no candidates being nominated. Suppose a voter
nominates his preferred candidate, for instance voter 1 nominating c
1
. Both voters then
realize that regardless of what other nominations are made, under the dominant strategy
of the voting round c
1
will be elected as voter 1 will cast an approval vote for c
1
. This
means that voter 2 should then also nominate c
2
, since the eventual outcome will then
be that both candidates are elected and voter 2 prefers this to just having c
1
elected.
Now, reasoning backwards, both voters can anticipate that if one candidate is nominated,
then the other one will also end up being nominated with an eventual outcome of both
candidates being elected. This means that both voters should be content to stay at the
status quo of having no nominations. Thus, the status quo is an equilibrium outcome
and it leads to the Pareto eÆcient outcome of no candidates being admitted.
Looking at the equilibrium reasoning also provides for an interesting comparison
between consistency and strong-consistency.
The following are CE([;])'s that satisfy (CE1) and (CE2): f([;])g, and f([;]); ([;]; [c
1
]; [c
1
; c
2
]);
([;]; [c
2
]; [c
1
; c
2
])g. The agenda (;; [c
1
]; [c
1
; c
2
]) represents that c
1
is rst nominated and
then c
2
is then nominated so that the eventual vote is over both candidates c
1
and c
2
.
The agenda ([;]) represents that no nominations are made.
Note that consistency identies CE([;]) = f([;]); (;; [c
1
]; [c
1
; c
2
]); (;; [c
2
]; [c
1
; c
2
])g as
the set of possible continuation equilibria; while strong consistency results in CE([;]) =
f([;])g. So, consistency allows for both the eÆcient an ineÆcient outcome as equilibria;
while strong consistency singles out the eÆcient outcome as the only possible equilibrium
outcome. This makes clear the dierence in reasoning behind consistency and strong
consistency. Consistency allows one to support the outcome of [c
1
; c
2
] under the following
reasoning: voter 1 nominates c
1
(which will eventually lead to both candidates being
nominated) under the expectation that if he does not then voter 2 will nominate c
2
(which will eventually lead to both candidates being nominated). Voter 1 and voter
2 both rationalize their actions via expectations concerning what the other might do if
they do not act. In contrast, strong consistency requires that one rationalize one's actions
relative to the worst possible outcome under each possible action, including not acting
if that is a possible equilibrium continuation. Since not acting is a possible continuation
equilibrium (as implied by (CE2)), no further nomination is strongly rationalizable.
While this example might suggest that strong consistency is a \better" concept than
consistency, we remark that nding the \right" renement of equilibria in this problem
may echo the problem of nding the \right" renement in game theory - there may be
no single obvious \right" answer, especially as one varies across contexts.
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Appendix
Take some voting rule V as given.
Let
EO(a) = [
a
0
2CE(a)
V (a
0
):
Proof of Lemma 4: We prove this by induction on the cardinality of a. If a 2 A
m
,
then CE(a) = fag, and so the assertion must be true. Suppose that for some K < m,
the claim is true for each k > K and a 2 A
k
. We show that the claim is true for a 2 A
K
.
From the induction hypothesis it follows that V (b) 2 D for all b 2 C
+
(a), and so
from (CE1) we only need to show that if V (a) =2 D, then a =2 CE(a). Consider any
x =2 a, and b 2 CE((a; x)). By the induction V (b) 2 D. Since V (a) =2 D, it follows from
the properties of D that V (b)P
i
V (a) for some i. (CE2) then implies that a =2 CE(a), as
required.
Proof of Theorem 3: Fix a Pareto eÆcient V and a prole P .
The proof that V (a
0
) is Pareto eÆcient for any a
0
in CE(a) and a 2 A follows directly
from Lemma 4, by letting D in the lemma be the set of Pareto eÆcient alternatives in
X.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we show that (CE1), (CE2) and (CE3) can be
satised if and only if
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CE(a) =
(
PE
+
(a) if V (a)R
i
V (a
0
) for all i and a
0
2 C
+
(a)
PE
+
(a) n a if V (a
0
)P
i
V (a) for some i and a
0
2 C
+
(a).
It is straightforward to check if CE(a) is dened above then (CE1), (CE2) and (CE3)
are satised. So we show the converse.
Consider CE(a) satisfying (CE1), (CE2) and (CE3). The proof proceeds by induction.
Note that for any a 2 A
m
, CE(a) = fag and that by the Pareto eÆciency of V the claim
follows directly. So, consider some K < m and suppose that the claims are true for any
agenda in A
k
for any k > K, and let us show that they hold for a 2 A
K
.
First, consider the case where V (a)R
i
V (a
0
) for all i and a
0
2 C
+
(a). In this case it
follows from (CE2) that a 2 CE(a). By the induction step, any a
0
2 C
+
(a) must result
in a Pareto eÆcient outcome, and so it follows that a
0
is rationalizable relative to a and
so by (CE3), a
0
2 CE(a). This implies that PE
+
(a)  CE(a). Also, from the induction
step V (a
0
) is Pareto eÆcient (relative toX) for any a
0
2 C
+
(a), and so CE(a)  PE
+
(a).
It follows that CE(a) = PE
+
(a).
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Note that in the second case it must be that PE
+
(a) n a is nonempty.
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Next, consider the case where V (a
0
)P
i
V (a) for some i and a
0
2 C
+
(a). In this case, by
(CE2) a =2 CE(a). Thus, by nonemptiness (CE1), there is some a
0
2 CE(a), where a
0
6= a.
By our induction any a
00
2 C
+
(a) is Pareto eÆcient, and so is rationalizable relative to
a
0
, and so by (CE3) a
00
2 CE(a). This implies that PE
+
(a) n a  CE(a). Also, from the
induction step V (a
0
) is Pareto eÆcient for any a
0
2 C
+
(a), and so CE(a)  PE
+
(a) n a.
It follows that CE(a) = PE
+
(a) n a.
Proof of Claim 6: Take any Pareto eÆcient x such that x = V (a) for some a =
(a
1
; ::::; a
m
). We prove by induction on k that a 2 CE((a
1
; ::::; a
k
)) for all k = 1; :::::; m.
The proof is obvious for k = m.
Now, assume that the assertion holds for k > K where K < m, let us show it holds for
K. By the Pareto eÆciency of V , given any y 6= V (a), there exists i such that V (a)R
i
y.
By the induction step, a 2 C
+
((a
1
; ::::; a
K
)), and so (CE3) then directly implies that
a 2 CE((a
1
; ::::; a
K
)).
Proof of Theorem 5: We rst show the rst claim in the theorem. We use Lemma 4.
Choose a 2 A and any
prole P 2 P

. Let D = [
b2A
Full
(a)
V (b). We show that D satises the conditions of
Lemma 4.
Take any y 2 D and x =2 D. Since V is Pareto eÆcient, y is not Pareto dominated
by x. Given that P 2 P

, this means that there is i 2 N such that yP
i
x.
Since D satises the required condition from Lemma reflem, it follows that EO(a) 
[
b2A(a)\A
m
V (b), as claimed in the theorem.
Next, we show that equality holds if consistency is satised. Note that since V is
Pareto eÆcient, the outcomes from full length extensions of a must be Pareto eÆcient. It
follows from Claim 6 that (CE1), (CE2) and (CE3) imply that the equilibrium continua-
tion outcomes following a coincide with the outcomes of full length agenda continuations
of a.
We now show the claim that the algorithm in Theorem 5 denes a
minimal set of consistent continuation equilibria, even when V may not be Pareto
eÆcient.
Consider the following denition of smallness on continuation equilibria. Given two
collections of sets of continuation equilibria fCE(a)g
a2A
and fCE
0
(a)g
a2A
, we say that
fCE(a)g
a2A
is smaller than fCE
0
(a)g
a2A
if CE(a)  CE
0
(a) for all a 2 A.
The minimal set of continuation equilibria may be identied as follows, as we shall
prove below.
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We dene CE

(a) by induction on the length of a. Consider a 2 A of length k and
let
C
+
(a) = [
x=2a
CE

((a; x))
Then we construct C

1
(a) as follows.
-Either V (a)R
i
V (a
0
) for all a
0
2 C
+
(a) and for all i 2 N . Then C

1
(a) = fag
-Or V (a
0
)P
i
V (a) for some a
0
2 C
+
(a) and some i 2 N . Let C
i
(a) be the subset of
C
+
(a) consisting of the agendas b in C
+
(a) such that V (b)R
i
V (a
0
) for all a
0
2 C
+
(a).
Then C

1
(a) = [
i2N
C
i
(a).
Then C

2
(a) is dened as the set
n
a
0
2 C
+
(a) : V (a
0
)R
i
V (b) for some b 2 C

1
(a) and some i 2 N
o
Since the set C
+
(a) is nite, there exists j such that C

j
(a) = C

j+1
(a): Dene CE

(a)
as
such a set.
It follows quite easily from the above construction that fCE

(a)g
a2A
is a collection
of sets of consistent continuation equilibria.
Next, let fCE

(a)g
a2A
be dened inductively by
CE

(a) =
(
PE
+
(a) if V (a)R
i
V (a
0
) 8i 2 N and 8a
0
2 C
+
(a)
PE
+
(a)na otherwise
Claim 18 There exists a unique smallest collection of sets of consistent continuation
equilibria which is given by fCE

(a)g
a2A
above, and this coincides with fCE

(a)g
a2A
.
Proof of Claim 18 :
Step 1: fCE

(a)g
a2A
is a collection of sets of consistent continuation equilibria and
CE

(a) = CE

(a) for all a 2 A and all P 2 P.
It is straightforward to see that fCE

(a)g
a2A
is a collection of sets of consistent
continuation equilibria .We prove the above identity by induction over #a. Assume that
CE

(a) = CE

(a) for all a such that #a > K and let a be such that #a = K.
Assume rst that a 2 CE

(a). Then it follows from the induction hypothesis
that V (a)R
i
V (a
0
; P ) 8i 2 N and 8a
0
2 C
+
(a) = C
+
(a) and therefore from (CE2),
a 2 CE

(a). We prove similarly that if a 2 CE

(a), then a 2 CE

(a). In that case, if
b 2 CE

(a), then b 2 CE

(a) as there exists at least one i 2 N such that V (b; P )R
i
V (a).
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Similarly, if b 2 CE

(a), then b 2 CE

(a). Assume indeed on the contrary that there ex-
ists c 2 C
+
(a) such that V (c; P )P
i
V (b; P ) 8i 2 N . Since from the induction hypothesis,
c 2 C
+
(a); we contradict our construction of CE

(a).
The proof of equality in the case where a =2 CE

(a)
is similar.
Step 2: Step 2: fCE

(a)g
a2A
is the unique smallest collection of sets of consistent
continuation equilibria.
This follows from Claim 6 and the characterization of fCE

(a)g
a2A
in Step 1.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Both assertions in the proposition follow from Lemma 4 . First, let D = TC(P ).
Since TC(P ) satises the requirements of D in the lemma, it follows from that if V is
top cycle consistent, then EO(a)  TC(T (P )).
To prove the second statement concerning Condorcet consistency, let P be any prole
with a Condorcet winner, say x. Then, let D = fxg. Since D satises the requirements
of the lemma, the statement follows.
Proof of Corollary 11: Note the following observations: (i) Any y which beats 0 must
have at least
n+1
2
projects built. (ii) Any x 2 X

(P ) beats any y such that yT (P )0 and
y =2 X

(P ) (as then y must involve at least
n+1
2
projects and yet be more expensive than
x).
Using these observations, it follows from (i) than only 0 or some choice of at least
n+1
2
projects can be the outcome of a full length agenda. From (ii) it follows that only
choices in X

(P ) can be the outcome of a full length agenda in A(a
0
). This implies that
only outcomes in X

(P ) (if it is nonempty) can be the outcomes of full length agendas
in A(a
0
). Next note that no element in X

(P ) beats any other element in X

(P ), and so
the rst one appearing in the agenda will be the outcome. This means that each element
in X

(P ) is the outcome of at least one full length agenda in A(a
0
). The result then
follows from Corollary 10.
Proof of Lemma 14: Let us show that setting CE(a) = M(a) for each a satises
(CE1)-(CE3).
It follows from the denition of maximal agenda that if a 2M
V
(a) thenM
V
(a) = A(a)
and moreover, that M
V
(b) = A(b) for all b 2 A(a). Then it easily follows that (CE1)-
(CE3) are satised starting at any maximal a at P . So, consider a 2 A that is not
maximal. By the denition of CE(a), it follows that C
+
(a) = [ x =2 aM
V
((a; x)). It
follows from the denition of maximality that [
x=2a
M
V
((a; x)) = M
V
(a). So, CE(a) =
C
+
(a) = M
V
(a). It then follows directly (noting nonemptiness of M) that (CE1) is
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satised. Next, using Pareto eÆciency of V , since a =2 M
V
(a), there must be b 2 M
V
(a)
such that V (b; P )P
i
V (a) for some i. Since a =2 M
V
(a), we know that a =2 CE(a),
which then satises (CE2) since we have established that V (b; P )P
i
V (a) for some i and
b 2 M
V
(a) = C
+
(a). Finally, note that given Pareto eÆciency of V , any b 2 M
V
(a)
must be Pareto optimal (if not, some y Pareto dominates x = V (b; P ), which implies
that y =2 b; but then by Pareto optimality V ((b; y); P ) 6= x which is a contradiction). It
then follows that for all distinct pairs b; c 2 M
V
(a), there exist i; j with bR
i
c and cR
j
b.
It then follows that all of C
+
(a) = M
V
(a) = CE(a) is rationalizable and that (CE3)
holds.
Proof of Theorem 15: Consider an innite X, a Pareto eÆcient voting rule V and a
prole of preferences P 2 P such that M
V
(a) is nonempty for each a 2 A.
The remaining part of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 5 after noting
that Lemma 4 and Claim 6 remain valid after some slight modication. That is, if
[
b2A(a)\A
m
V (b; P ) is replaced by [
b2A(a)\M
V
(a)
V (b; P ) in Lemma 4, the modied state-
ment remains true. Similarly, Claim 6 can be modied to show that if V is Pareto eÆcient
and x = V (b; P ) for some b 2 M
V
(a) for some a, then a 2 EO
V
(a). The details are left
to the reader.
38
111
001
010
100
000
110
101
011
Figure 1:
39
